Our website uses cookies so we can analyse our site usage and give you the best experience. Click "Accept" if you’re happy with this, or click "More" for information about cookies on our site, how to opt out, and how to disable cookies altogether.
We respect your Do Not Track preference.
A recent data breach involved a deliberate email phishing attack on an organisation. The email looked like it came from the chief executive and requested a copy of the membership list (names and email addresses).
At the time, the CEO was away from the office. This fact could have been known by the person who sent the phish, as a high-profile person’s travel for work is often publicly known. Because this attack was targeted, it was not easy to spot. One of the reply addresses was unfamiliar, but the other was the CEO’s work email address so the unfamiliar one could have been assumed to be their personal email address.
The request was also plausible, particularly since the information asked for was limited to names and email addresses.
The most effective way for an organisation to protect against this form of attack would be to have a policy of independently verifying requests for sensitive information. Since this might involve junior staff having to contact senior management to verify a request, employees need to be confident that they are expected to do so.
A basic phish can usually be spotted by moving your mouse cursor over the link without clicking. The text that pops up when you do that will usually look different from what you might expect. This difference might be just one character. Moving the mouse cursor over the reply email address can also be helpful when in doubt.
The basic phishing email below is an example. It shouldn’t have been addressed to “undisclosed-recipients” as your bank can address an email just to you. And you can see the box that popped up when the mouse cursor was held over the link. An address of “alex-parus.ru/” does not seem likely for a New Zealand company to use.